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From Nationalism to
Post-Developmentalism:
The Intersection of Gender, Race
and Religion in Malaysia
Maznah Mohamad

I. Introduction
Malaysia is an important example of a plural society, with 65 percent
of its population comprised of Malays and other indigenous communities, 26 percent Chinese, and 7 percent Indian.1 While diversity
abounds, political and cultural life is also strongly dominated by
Islam, the sole religion of the Malays. As importantly, ethnicity has
been the basis upon which political divisions are promoted. Further,
ethnic identity is prioritized over all other identities in the pursuit of
economic, social, and cultural interests. This is a discussion of how the
factors of gender, race, and religion have intersected to characterize the
construction of Malaysian nationalism and then in the consolidation
and dismantling of the developmental state. The changing circumstances of national economic and political interests has given rise to a
multifaceted Malaysian paradigm in which gender, race, and religion
are intertwined to become objects and subjects of regime maintenance
and challenge. Out of the three factors, religious identity is becoming
the most salient dynamic in the country’s political course. But an
equally forceful challenge in the form of discourse and demands for
gender rights and multicultural democracy is tempering the exclusive
rise of an ethnic and religion-based trend. I will reflect upon the
Malaysian search for a sociocultural or relevant paradigm that is able
to redress problems created out of a skewed and perhaps too rapid
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process of economic ascendance, and an intractable politics of identity
construction.
The three periodic moments that I will describe are nationalism,
developmentalism, and post-developmentalism. Nationalism was a
period during which the people struggled to resist colonial domination, which was then followed by the construction of a cohesive territorial nation through accommodative or coercive means to overcome
ethnic, religious, tribal, or linguistic divides. I define the concept of
developmentalism as a phase of economic and political transformation
that is charted by dirigisme, with the state driving the market rather
than led by it. It is when “government anoints winners in business,
often subsidizing research and development, promoting exports, and
deepening Asia’s neo-mercantilist industrialization; that is, the state
leads, the market follows.”2 The developmental state that existed in
Malaysia also thrived on a quasi-democracy led by an authoritarian
leadership. The next phase, post-developmentalism, is defined as a
phase in which the requisites of economic growth provided by a
dirigiste state are no longer tenable or available. This happened when
financial globalization arose and Asian economies succumbed to the
unfettered flows of short-term portfolio capital. At this time, state
power declines while capital markets take over.3 The aftermath of the
1997 Asian financial crisis left the Malaysian economy battered, and
although there was a semblance of recovery, looming global uncertainty yielded a failure to restore a sense of assured economic upturn.
The erosion of performance legitimacy due to economic attrition will
also lead to a crisis in the political legitimacy of the authoritarian state,
although this does not necessarily portend the swift or total demise of
an old order.
In tracing Malaysia’s course of nationalism, developmentalism, and
its aftermath, post-developmentalism, I argue that the politics of gender, race, and religion have adapted to accommodate numerous tensions and conflicting demands. The nationalist phase successfully
contained unfettered multicultural demands through the employ of an
elite-dictated consociational model for postcolonial nation building.
However, by the late 1960s, the tenuousness of ethnic balance in postcolonial Malaysia had led to an eruption of open conflict. Its aftermath
saw conditions of socioeconomic inequality levelled out through the
use of an affirmative-action instrument. This coincided with a developmental phase of economic growth whereby the heavy hand of the state
was employed both to guide market forces and to contain counter-
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hegemonic political expressions. During this phase, although ethnic
polarization was not manifested openly, political and social goals
revolved even more deeply around particularistic cultural roots. For
example, Islamization became a powerful force in demarcating the
identity of the Malay from the non-Malay. In tandem, non-Malay political expressions were also tied to the assertion of cultural goals rather
than to challenging the construct of governance that limited the equal
recognition of their citizenship status. But the rewards accrued out of
Malaysia’s phase of developmentalism allayed the rise of any successful dissent against a cohesive and economically salient state.
There is now a strong suggestion that Malaysia, like the rest of the
once successful newly-industrializing countries of East Asia, may well
be entering the phase of post-developmentalism. The economic and
political trajectory that once led to spectacular growth rates in these
countries is forced to take a different course with the intensification of
financial globalization. There is now a restructuring of economic as
well as political paradigms that national governments are wont to
undertake in order to respond to global and domestic challenges. In
Malaysia’s case, its old political model of “conditional” consociational
democracy with Malay political dominance at the core is being subjected to a reassessment by civil society. While socioeconomic disparity
between indigenous Malays and non-Malays may have been narrowed
due to a strategy of economic growth with redistribution, a new basis
for ethnic cleavage is also emerging. There is a clamoring for universal
demands — such as democracy and human rights — while at the same
time partisans of particularistic recognition for religious-based systems
of governance, such as that provided by Islam, are equally vociferous.
It would seem that this new phase has become the moment that nonMalays can seize upon to remedy the unequal “social contract”
hatched by their elites during the eve of Malaysia’s independence. At
the same time, the present has also become the moment for Islamists to
reclaim their right to their own authentic and culturally entrenched
systems displaced at the hands of colonial intervention. Today, the
withering away of developmentalism has forced a rethinking about
whether a national project centered around neo-liberal growth strategies and Western-centric capitalism would be the best or even the only
option left for the pursuit of a common good for a plural nation like
Malaysia.
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II. Nationalism: Locating Gender and Race in the
Struggle for Self-Rule
To put the question of race, gender, and religion into a coherent perspective, we have to trace their points of intersection back to the beginnings of nationalist aspirations in the country. Malaysia’s nationalist
struggles were participated in equally by the three major races,
Malays, Chinese, and Indians, who were then living under the administration of British colonialism.4 The post-independence system that
was eventually set up was a version of liberal democracy with a multiethnic consociational pact, and a modern state with deliberate policies
to leave elements of traditional authority intact. While a secular postcolonial constitution was enacted, a dualism was also set in place.
Decentralized traditional authority in the form of the Malay sultanate
was preserved, even with the establishment of a federal system and a
parliamentary democracy. Customary laws in the form of Islamic family laws, or the Sharia, were also allowed to exist vis-à-vis secular civil
laws. This establishment of a dualistic national entity also explains the
origins and basis of Malay (native) dominance in politics, which intermittently seeks to override and contest the secular state that is dependent upon a multiethnic consensus.
As for women, regardless of their ethnic origins, it was the tumultuous period of the Second World War, during which British colonial
supremacy was rattled by Japanese militarism, which turned out to be
their most important watershed period. The events of the time led to
the flowering of their anti-imperialist sentiments. This politicization
was also imbued with the early strivings of feminist emancipation.
Nationalist movements, of which women were very much a part,
spurred debates about women’s roles in the workplace, their rights to
formal education, and their participation in political organizations.5
Ironically, such consciousness originated not simply from anti-imperialist mobilization but from the modernist project of colonialism itself.
But race-based consciousness has impeded any coming together of
multicultural women even though they all may view access to schooling and political participation as a universal goal.
Early Malay nationalist movements were left-leaning. For example,
the National Federation of Malay Associations (PKKM) was created
soon after World War II and became one of the first avenues for Malay
women to take up nontraditional roles. PKKM was one of the first
political parties to establish a women’s wing, known as the Force of
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Awakened Women (AWAS), ahead of the other non-Malay, more
urbanized political parties. Although women were largely recruited
for populist mobilization and expediency, strong and outstanding
women personalities emerged out of this political strategy, even if it
was male directed. It was the return of British colonial control over
Malaya after the defeat of the Japanese Army that eventually thwarted
the further rise of AWAS. A few years after the British military administration resumed control, the PKKM and its women and youth wings
were disbanded because of their pro-Japanese, leftist, and militant
bent. Subsequently, colonial administrators cultivated the more moderate nationalist (but British-friendly) party, the United Malays
National Organization (UMNO), in the negotiation for eventual selfrule.
During this phase of nationalist uprising, non-Malay women,
whose forefathers largely came as immigrants from China and India,
continued to define their loyalty as belonging to their original homelands. Citizenship in their new country, British Malaya at that time,
was an ambiguous notion. Among Chinese women, it was their
schooling experience, moulded after the system in China, which
played a pivotal role in influencing their specific political involvements. Some joined the anarchist movement, and many more became
members of the Malayan Communist Party.6 Some of the most active
Indian women also joined political movements being fought in India.
In 1941, when Chandra Bose formed the Indian Independence Movement and the Indian Independence Army, Indian women in Malaya
were recruited to be part of the Rhani of Jansi Regiment of the Army,
and travelled to Burma to make their way into India.7 Despite having
anti-colonialism as a common defining purpose, the mobilization for
such a cause was still forged along an uncommon identity-distinct
platform. The concept of a liberated nation-state was not necessarily
the physical ground upon which one stood.
These reasons explain why party politics that downplayed ethnic
differences were unsuccessful in attracting adherents. The Independence of Malaya Party (IMP), set up in 1951 with its membership open
to all races, specifically promised equal opportunities, regardless of
sex. However, it barely survived for a year after its formation. Another
multiracial party, the Parti Negara, was launched in 1954 and even
promised equal pay for equal work, and equal opportunities as well as
emancipation for women. This party, too, failed to leave a mark in the
country’s first election. Another non-communal party, the Pan-
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Malayan Labour Party, which committed itself to ensuring women’s
equality by including a proposal for a Women’s Charter, was also
unsuccessful in garnering mass electoral support. Malaysian women’s
early involvement in formal politics was only successful if it followed
the model of the inter-ethnic consociational “cartel.” Nationalism was
based on particularistic ethnic concerns and therefore overrode all
other political projects, such as feminism or labor unionism. Even
though women’s rights were recognized as an important objective by
the nationalists, they could not be universally or successfully forged,
given that women of the different races did not get together.
It was only six years after independence, in 1963, that a significant
nongovernmental multiracial woman’s organization, the National
Council for Women’s Organizations (NCWO), was formed.The creation of the NCWO was spurred by the issue of women’s unequal pay,
which was first highlighted by the Women Teacher’s Union, an organization formed in 1960.8 Women’s unequal pay was an issue that
strongly galvanized middle-class and urban-based women. The impetus for the formation of the NCWO also came from an overall global
trend in the 1960s to gain recognition for the rights of working women.
International bodies like the Young Women’s Christian Association
(YWCA) contributed significantly to the formation of the NCWO. In
fact, it was at the YWCA’s initiative that a conference of women’s
groups was organized in 1960, and the NCWO was subsequently
formed. In tandem with this development, the NCWO’s establishment
was further boosted by the close cooperation of the women’s wing of
UMNO, the then premier Malay party. The woman leader of UMNO
saw in the NCWO a formal structure that could serve as an umbrella
coalition for the different groups that the party had mobilized.9
The NCWO became the vehicle through which legislative reforms
granting equal pay, women’s equal access to public service jobs, and
marital rights were achieved. Several of the Chairpersons of the
NCWO had also been women ministers in the cabinet, making the
NCWO not only a close ally of the government, but a mirror of the elite
consociational-democratic model adopted by the ruling coalition
party. Although non-partisan, the identification of NCWO with the
ruling government was so strong that representatives from two opposition parties, the Socialist and Islamic parties, withdrew their membership from the organization in 1965.10
The politics of inter-ethnic compromise, accommodation, and bargaining, as levers for successful negotiations with the British for even-
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tual self-rule, also influenced the style of women’s involvement in formal politics after the independent nation-state came into being. The
Alliance party, which became the first government, originally consisted of three ethnic-based parties, the UMNO (United Malays
National Organization), MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association), and
the MIC (Malayan Indian Congress). They all did their part in sponsoring women’s entry into politics. The few women candidates fielded in
national elections by their respective ethnic-based parties have comfortably won elections on the strength of their parties.11 Such a tradition ensured women’s unfailing presence in electoral politics but did
not allow women leaders to test social limits or to challenge
entrenched systems through parliamentary democracy. Since women’s
wings occupy a subordinate status within their parties, women who
were nominated to stand and got elected were inevitably more
beholden to their patrons in the party than to their electorates outside.12
Internal reforms to break the vicious circle of gender inequality within
party structures have also never occurred in post-independence
Malaysia. Furthermore, the strength in numbers of women voters has
failed to translate into gender reforms. Thus, the issue of women’s representation in parliament has remained irrelevant as a precondition for
gender empowerment despite the strong perception that the women’s
role in formal politics can lead to a change for women.13 This is a condition which is not unlike that experienced by other Asian countries
where women’s formal representation in national legislatures has been
less important in pushing for women-oriented policies than has the
role played by autonomous women’s groups.14
III. Developmentalism: The Making of an AuthoritarianDevelopmental State and the Construction of Identity Politics
With the waning of nationalist ideology as the basis for political
activism, Malaysia entered its postcolonial phase, potentially vulnerable to ethnic dissension and worsening race relations. The basis for this
was the marked socioeconomic gap between politically dominant but
poorer Malays and the economically advanced but politically disenfranchised non-Malays. In 1969, an open and violent ethnic clash broke
out between Malays and Chinese in the city of Kuala Lumpur.
Although isolated to this one city, the event provided enough fuel to
become the turning point in Malaysia’s history of multiethnic nation
building. Out of this racially violent confrontation, national strategies
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were restructured to remedy the sense of Malay grievance born out of
the tragedy. Pressure to overcome the condition of Malay economic
backwardness led to the implementation of the New Economic Policy
(NEP), an affirmative-action instrument designed to redress the economic inequality experienced by the indigenous community, Bumiputera, vis-à-vis the non-Bumiputera.15 This policy of social engineering
through extensive state intervention was justified with the rationale
that the economic mobility of Malays and indigenous people had been
unfairly denied by history.
After three decades of implementation, beginning in 1972, the NEP
delivered both positive and adverse changes. The socioeconomic disparity between Malays and Chinese has been narrowed, and there has
been a rapid rate of urbanization among the formerly rural-based
Malay population, thus allowing them to enter the modern workforce
in large numbers. This narrowing of the economic gap has subsequently contributed to the swelling of a Malay urban middle-class. It
will be seen later that this factor alone may have precipitated a “new”
politics in Malaysia. On the downside, the social distributive function
of the NEP has been distorted, resulting in the creation of a small class
of wealthy Malay capitalists, along with the rise of capitalists of all
races. The institutionalization of patronage politics, business cronyism,
and corruption were also some of the adverse consequences of the
unchecked aspects of the policy. In other words, its implementation
has spawned a high degree of clientelistic politics. But more than
affecting the social and economic structure of the country, the NEP
was the discourse and substance upon which the Malaysian politics of
gender, race, and religion were continually shaped.
There developed a syndrome in which, with the NEP’s implementation, virtually all aspects of Malaysia’s political, social, and cultural
lives were to become ethnically reduced, or hyperethnicized. The term
hyperethnicity is used here to mean an all-encompassing ethnicization
whose defenders constantly try to subsume any politics that are outside of the goal of the preservation of ethnic particularities. In
Malaysia’s phase of developmentalism, despite the existence of an
overarching national agenda for economic growth, there was a heightening of identity politics, acting as a form of boundary closure to mark
off the Bumiputera or, largely, the Malay from the non-Malay. Islam as
a religion was simultaneously incorporated to lend more definitive
authenticity to the identity of the cultural Malay or was used to displace the old, maligned Malay characterizations (“the lazy native”),
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purported to be the source of the group’s backwardness. For this, a
new, “Islamized” identity was adopted by Malays, as it was more
assertive and forceful, and had strength in a global movement. Having
been “peripheralized” and “ossified” by colonial protectionist policy,
they found that the only way out of this rut was to embrace new parameters for a Malay reassertion.16
Subsequently, specific political causes became formally and informally identified as the exclusive domain of particular ethnic groups
(Islamic women’s rights to be articulated only by Muslims, Chinese
education rights to be taken up only by Chinese political parties, and
estate worker’s rights only by Indian political parties). As a result, it
was difficult to universalize any cross-ethnic political projects.
Autonomous civil society was enfeebled by this situation of hyperethnicization, while the other, bigger, ethnically polarized and encapsulated civil society largely became a mere extension of the state.17 The
inevitable outcome of the NEP was that it was implemented through a
series of legal instruments that enhanced the repressive apparatuses of
the state to limit civil and political freedoms.18 Ultimately, people
either pragmatically acquiesced to the national project (largely, a disempowered non-Malay constituency); instrumentally accepted it
(largely, those who had the capacity to benefit from it); or reinforced
identity politics through it for the further assertion of political dominance and exclusivity (largely, Malays and Muslims).19 Nevertheless,
despite the increasing shroud of political apathy, the tightening of civil
liberties, and the reinforcement of identity politics, the spectacular economic growth that Malaysia experienced ensured that all of these reactions would persist with minimal social costs to the state.
As the cycle of pragmatic acquiescence, instrumental acceptance,
and identity reinforcement spiralled and intensified, the residual civil
society with its articulation of more universal causes — such as justice,
democracy, accountable governance, and human rights — struck little
resonance with this polarized polity. Even if there were to be formidable counterhegemonic dissent, this, too, had to be fostered within an
ethnicized space. The Islamic counterhegemonic movement, the Darul
Arqam, was mobilized exclusively among Malays, while at the level of
formal representative politics, the biggest opposition party, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), was Chinese based and Chinese supported.
The sweep of Islamization was not merely necessitated by an economically induced cultural project; it was also reinforced by a political
void created by the imperatives of an authoritarian and developmental
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state to contain civil society elements, beginning with communist
insurgents. Its “Cold War” fervor in suppressing communist, socialist,
leftist, and labor movements in postcolonial Malaysia (particularly
after the May 1969 riots) led to the destruction of a once-vibrant civil
society. In such an atmosphere, Islam remained as one of the last bastions, if not the only legitimate site, for limited counterhegemony.
Among Muslims, the space provided by Islam became the only feasible ambit within which divergent, though circumscribed, political
expressions could find root. Islam was in actual fact a two-edged
sword. It was a force that the state wanted to contain as well as to coopt. It served to legitimize the politics of “Malay domination” but, on
the other hand, it was also the site in which remnants of any Malay
opposition (or its latent variety) could safely be ensconced. As such,
even as Islamization was co-opted as a state project, the strongest
opposition against this state was the Islamic party.
Non-Muslim Malaysians largely chose the route of compliance
because, for them, post-independence, post-1969 Malaysian politics
spelled “the end of ideology,” or an end to class politics that they previously engaged in to countermand divisive ethnic politics and affirm
a political role for themselves. But the deployment of draconian measures eventually marginalized dissidents of the Left, a majority of
whom were Chinese. In addition to demolishing the ideological presence of the Left, the state also obscured the nascent project for multicultural democratization. Chinese activists (even among those with a
leftist tradition) diverted their political energies into fighting for issues
within ethnicized rubrics, such as Chinese language, education, and
cultural rights, often within the safe limits of electoral politics.20 Later,
as the developmental state — with its relentless agenda for economic
growth — took precedence over the dictates of Cold War politics, a
majority of Malaysians simply chose the path of pragmatic acquiescence. They became driven by self-seeking economic interests rather
than by wider political goals, which were becoming elusive and practically unobtainable. Whatever dissent or sense of dejection they had
over the legitimacy of the state gradually transmuted into an instrumentalist acceptance of what the state was able to offer in the form of
economic gains and expedient notions of cultural “freedoms.”21 This
contributed further to the hyperethnicization of the polity, with a culturally and politically engaged Islamized Malay polity on one side, in
conjunction with an instrumentally depoliticized and pragmatic nonMalay polity on the other. A once oppositional Chinese-based regional
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party, the Gerakan, exemplified the condition of instrumental depoliticization when it decided to join the ruling National Front as a coalition
partner during the first national election of the post-1969 period.22 Chinese political parties acted upon a perception that they could bargain
for their circumscribed rights more effectively within the UMNO-led
national coalition than if they were outside of it. But the two Chinese
parties, the MCA and Gerakan, have in effect played second fiddle to
UMNO, steering clear of challenging the reified notion of Malay dominance, or pushing the limits of Chinese economic or cultural rights
beyond the NEP norms. A small and disempowered non-Malay sector,
in unity with a smaller sector of the Malay polity, constituted whatever
was left of civil society. This residual civil society, enfeebled by hyperethnicization, nevertheless sustained itself through the promotion of
movements for labor and environmental, consumer, democratic,
human, and women’s rights.
Despite the overwhelming tide of Islamization and the reaffirmation of ethnic divides, the feminist movement did manage to take root
in the country. However, it mainly coalesced around the violenceagainst-women (VAW) issue. The peculiarity of local political and economic conditions made it difficult for the movement to expand beyond
its middle-class, urban, and largely non-Malay enclave. Violence
against women was the only issue left that had a common denominator in every woman’s life, regardless of class and ethnicity. It was also
simply the only site not captured or hyperethnicized by the state.
Thus, for almost two decades, feminist organizing centered not only
strategically but also pragmatically around the issue of VAW.23
The growth of the feminist movement in the 1980s was also not able
to draw the support of a new group of working-class women created
out of Malaysia’s experience of rapid industrialization. Starting in the
late 1970s, there was a massive and rapid entry of rural women into
the industrial workforce.24 The “horrors” of waged work and cultural
dislocation seemed to lend the right conditions for their political mobilization. Yet this did not happen. First, as soon as the country
embarked upon attracting foreign investments for its export sector,
laws were enacted that prohibited unionization among workers in the
foreign-owned electronic sector, where women were largely located.
Second, since a majority of industrial workers were Malay Islamic
women, there was a culturally induced form of resistance against
unionization and feminism. In the early years of export-led industrialization, the involvement of Malay women in factory work was not
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looked upon kindly. Women were labelled “morally loose” and considered “easy sexual prey” due to an array of new “administrative and
regulatory mechanisms.”25 Young, unmarried, rural women were
brought out from their villages for the first time and were housed as a
group in the cities without parental supervision, a practice that was
uncommon at that time. As if to redeem their sullied moral identities,
after having been subjected to a slew of cultural admonishments by
representatives of their own communities, Malay women workers situated their loyalty even more definitively within their ethnicity rather
than class.26 Pressure to preserve the moral fabric of being Malay,
which was also undergoing a reconstitution through Islam at this same
time, reaffirmed the women’s role in the reproduction of the patriarchal family, even though massive numbers of rural women were experiencing a change in their economic status.
The feminist movement was even more detached from the reach of
rural, peasant women. The rural Malay constituency was a domain
that was almost wholly “hegemonized” by Malay political forces that
either represented the state or the opposition. The ruling Malay party,
UMNO, heavily patronized the Malay peasantry because rural constituencies were delineated so as to increase the number of Malaymajority seats. This gave the greatest electoral advantage to Malay
candidates who stood under UMNO. As these constituencies were
strategic for UMNO’s electoral dominance, the state maintained a tight
control over Malay villages. State development committees, although
set up and funded by the state, were de facto the eyes and ears of the
party. Resources and subsidies were channelled through these committees, in exchange for political loyalty toward the party.27 Nevertheless, despite UMNO’s rural hegemony, the main opposition party, the
Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), also succeeded in building up its base
within the rural enclave. One reason why PAS was successful was that
there inevitably existed various lacunae in UMNO’s patronage net,
especially since resources are not limitless. It is not coincidental that
some of the poorest villages in the poorest Malay states are also the
hotbed of Islamic opposition politics, where economic or social deprivation of the rural poor are being articulated through the language of
Islam. During the pre-independence phase, when the state maintained
a weaker hegemony over the peasantry, insurgent movements succeeded in establishing their bases in the rural interior and recruited
peasant women into various nationalist movements, including that of
the outlawed Malayan Communist Party. Unlike gender activism asso-
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ciated with nationalist movements of the past, contemporary feminist
groups have been unable to make any inroads into the rural Malay
heartland. Quite clearly, the feminism that was promoted in
Malaysia’s developmental phase was ensconced within a particularistic middle-class and Western-liberal framework, hence undermining
its ability to universalize the causes of gender rights and equality.
At this time, a large majority of Malay-Muslim, middle-class, and
professional women did not find it necessary to engage with feminism
because a majority of them, especially youths, were drawn to Islamic
movements, either by choice or peer pressure. These movements
ranged from fundamentalist-radical, even counterhegemonic (such as
the Darul Arqam), to those characterized as modernist and mainstream
because they had close ties with the ruling party, UMNO, such as the
Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM). There were also NGOs, for example
the Islamic Reform Congregation (JIM), which drew a large part of
their membership from Malays studying abroad. JIM claims to be a
movement of “reform,” and draws people to the Islamic way of life
through the charitable acts of providing educational and health services to the community. Many women professionals, such as doctors
and teachers, have been involved in the provision of such services.
The overall project of Islamic movements was to integrate, not separate, gender interests within the larger rubric of Islamization. Educated, professional Muslim women within these organizations
advocated the principle of gender complementarity rather than equality. Even though the VAW campaigns during the 1980s and 1990s were
participated in by a wide spectrum of women’s groups, ranging from
mainstream to feminist (largely non-Malay based), the absence of
Malay women’s representatives from Islamic groups was quite stark.
But it must also be noted that, with the exception of the Darul Arqam,
the main urban Islamic groups that had large women’s membership,
particularly ABIM and JIM, belonged to the Islamic mainstream. Like
the other hyperethnicized components of civil society, they were also
an extension of the state (which portrayed itself as committed to
Islamic governance), and did not identify with labor, women’s, or
human rights causes in any prominent way. Even the VAW issue did
not provide enough of a bridge to bring middle-class Islamic women
and feminist groups together. In fact, when the Domestic Violence Act
was passed in 1994, women members of ABIM voiced their concern
that this legislation did not differentiate the legal jurisdictions of Muslim women from non-Muslim women.28 Their point was that Muslim
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women and issues affecting their status within the family could not be
governed by a civil act, as only the Sharia family law would have jurisdiction over them.29 They were making the point that the Sharia had an
in-built provision to deal with the issue of spousal violence.
Most Muslim movements in the mid-1990s were also under the
direct or tacit sponsorship of the state. Even the Darul Arqam, with its
“non-mainstream” Islamic activities, could get around state proscriptions by garnering its own cultural legitimacy among ordinary Malays.
The rest of the Islamic civil society was a “captured civil society,” performing its role as the purveyor of the ideology of separateness and
exclusivity. It was only after the sacking of Anwar in September 1998
that ABIM (being founded by Anwar himself in the 1970s) found itself
to be on the opposite side of the Mahathir government. JIM, which had
an image of being non-partisan before the Anwar crisis, almost
instantly took an active, even partisan, role in the Reformasi movement.
IV. Post-Developmentalism:
Crisis, Realignment, and the Search for a New Politics
The Asian Crisis of 1997 was significant in terms of the economic damage and political upheaval that it brought to the formerly prosperous
East Asian newly-industrializing countries. Malaysia had an erstwhile
stable and confident newly-industrializing status until 1997, when the
crisis struck the region. Malaysia’s once-assured economic trajectory of
growth and stability is currently being subjected to numerous reassessments. Scholars have yet to describe this new phase in Southeast Asian
development with any clear and definitive label. What is obvious,
however, is that the state of quasi-democracy promoted by the authoritarian governments of the region to direct their countries’ economic
performance is now undergoing some kind of deconstruction as well
as a reconstruction.
Does gender matter at all during periods of social and political
upheaval? Looking back through the modern historical formation of
Malaysia, it is quite clear that gender does matter during periods of
dramatic change, or transitional periods that divide the passing away
of an old order from the initiation of a new one. This essay does not
categorically suggest that what we are seeing in Malaysia is a clear
transitional moment. Whether Malaysia’s old order is at the brink of its
existence is a highly debatable question. In Malaysia, the prefix “post”
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can hardly be applied to any of its constructs with great sureness, yet
all this may belie a silent anger festering within the system.
It is a fact that Prime Minister Mahathir’s dismissal of his deputy
Anwar from office in September 1998 swiftly sparked a Reformasi
(reformation) movement.30 Almost as soon as Anwar was dismissed
from government, many of the Malay-Muslim mainstream organizations rallied to seek justice for Anwar against what they perceived to
be Mahathir’s unjust and “un-Islamic” tactic of political assassination.
This was eventually articulated as a wider struggle for transparent
governance and democratization. Subsequently, Anwar’s prison
assault, unfair trial, and simultaneous exposure of government corruption eventually affected a broader spectrum of the civil society, leading
to the emergence of a coalition of plural forces, consisting of formal
political parties and autonomous movements. The Alternative Front
opposition coalition (the BA) was formed and consisted of four major
parties, namely, the Islamic Party (PAS), the Democratic Action Party
(DAP), the People’s Party (PRM) and the newly formed National Justice Party (Keadilan). It was reflective of this “rainbow” partnership,
which seized upon the situation of a weakening state as an opportunity for rebuilding and reconstituting the strength of counterhegemonic forces, or of the residual civil society against an overpowering
state.
The question is why would Malay elites, who derived clear advantages from the state’s affirmative-action policy, suddenly embrace a
cross-ethnic opposition movement after the financial crisis? In addition, why would secular feminists as well as the residual but
autonomous civil society also find it necessary to participate in this
multiethnic and multisectarian coalition? It must be stressed that it
was not the financial crisis per se that led to the ascendancy of this
Reformasi wave. In the early stages, it was a largely Malay-based outrage. Anwar, a charismatic, former dissident Islamic activist, was considered an icon of reformist Islam when he was brought on board to
join UMNO in 1982. Hence, his dismissal angered a section of the
urban-based Malay middle-class, which had identified with Anwar’s
Islamist aspirations. By 1998, the NEP had also created a core of selfassured Malay middle-class people who were less dependent upon
government patronage for upward mobility, and thus had few qualms
about being more critical of the UMNO-led government. Another reason why the cross-ethnic opposition movement came about was due to
the impending national election of 1999. There was a strong sense that
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the ruling National Front government could either be unseated or
denied its hitherto unbroken record of winning a two-thirds majority,
given the level of disaffection that had been generated, both from its
handling of the financial crisis and over the Anwar issue. The strategy
of building this coalition was pragmatic since it increased the chance of
unseating the incumbent government.
Without the financial crisis erupting in tandem with the Anwar
episode, the erstwhile unassailability of the developmental-authoritarian state would not have been so easily challenged. By 1998, concepts
of democracy, government accountability, and human rights had
begun to take on a more universal ring among a wider constituency.
There was a more acute realization of government economic mismanagement. The palpable experience of civil freedoms being violated
were subsequently felt by Reformasi, activists whose activities were
curtailed either by police violence or by state employment of draconian laws to frustrate the rise of any credible opposition force.31
Also interesting is that in the country’s 1999 general election,
women voters, women’s causes, and the women’s movement gained
more attention than at any other time. Although the election did not
lead to substantial gains for women’s rights in terms of policies and
equality, there was nevertheless a visible improvement in terms of
women’s representation at the legislative level. The outcome of the
election saw more women elected into parliament than ever before,
with twenty women parliamentarians comprising 10.4 percent of the
House of Representatives, as compared to 7.8 percent in 1995 and 6.1
percent in 1990. The election also delivered a larger number of women
opposition leaders to parliament compared with previous elections.
The four women opposition leaders accounted for 9 percent of the
opposition seats while government women representatives comprised
11 percent of the seats won by the ruling coalition party.
There are two reasons why the period leading up to the country’s
recent election saw the marked politicization and co-optation of
women’s issues. First, from the opposition perspective, it had to do
with the entry of Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, the wife of Anwar Ibrahim,
as a leading icon of opposition forces. She became the leader of the
newly-formed opposition party, the National Justice Party, and had
quickly become a popular figure in the Reformasi movement. In a way,
her thrust into politics had stoked the public imagination about the
importance of gender in the politics of change and democratization.32
There was an irony in this situation. While the Reformasi movement
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was rallying behind a woman leader, the strongest force in this solidarity “front” of diverse social groups and political parties was PAS,
whose leaders and policies were muted when it came to supporting
feminist rights.
Second, from the government viewpoint, faced with mounting public disaffection, only a strategy that could effectively disparage the
strongest opposition party, the Islamic Party, would save the incumbent government from possible electoral defeat. The use of the “gender
card” by the incumbent government killed two birds with one stone.
By appeasing the liberal constituents (rather than just women) with
promises and commitments to women’s rights, the Mahathir government hoped to divert the support of women and the middle-classes
away from Wan Azizah by offsetting the impression that her leadership would necessarily augur women’s empowerment. The gender
strategy was aimed at turning women, non-Malays, and liberals away
from PAS, because its misogynistic policies, which the government
widely emphasized, only promised the bleakest of prospects for
women’s advancement.
But for opposition politics, there was also an opportunity to test the
limits of feminism and its acceptance among voters. The Islamic Party
was thrown into a dilemma between upholding strategies that might
be in conflict with its conservative stance on gender rights and the
need to abandon such an ideological position in order to be unified
within the coalition. It ultimately chose to back a feminist candidate,
who contested on the opposition ticket. For example, it threw its support behind Zaitun Kassim, who contested under the ticket of the
Democratic Action Party (DAP) with feminism as her platform. PAS,
unlike the DAP, had superior election machinery, so it was this that
ensured the success of Zaitun Kassim’s campaign.33 In this instance,
PAS was quite willing to cooperate with a woman candidate of
another coalition partner although it did not field any women candidates of its own.34
Malaysia’s political crisis and the realignment of ruling and opposition forces marked an important historical watershed. Since government credibility had suffered because of the crisis, there was an
opening provided by such cracks. Opposition forces and the broad
spectrum of civil society were able to renew, reorganize, and reassess
their roles in affecting the course of possible transformations. Examples elsewhere (such as Latin America) have also shown that different
opposition parties will be compelled to bury their varied and contra-
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dictory principles in order to form a united front for electoral gain. The
regime will also be pushed into adopting uncharacteristic measures to
counter the concerted challenge.35
This discussion has shown that the issue of why women cannot be
organized within a united feminist movement revolves around their
manifold interests and identities. However, the study has shown that
conditions can exist — no matter how momentary or partial — that
enable the reconstruction of identities to support emerging interests,
and, to a certain extent, engender shared visions out of multiple identities. A particular and localized condition, such as “Malay” Islamization, did not necessarily mitigate the acceptance of a “universalized”
value, such as human rights and democracy, during the phase of Reformasi. Values are fluid enough to enable them to be expediently constructed or deconstructed to take on either a universalized or a
localized form. However, in grappling with the above issues, one may
also need to ask how long a “politics of solidarity in difference”36 can
last in a multiethnic and plural society like Malaysia, especially when
the common enemy, in the form of a perceived dictatorial order, is no
longer present?
I argued from the outset that Malaysia’s racial politics may not easily lead to the cultivation of a multicultural democracy or positive
diversity. State development policies, exemplified by the NEP, have
explicitly set apart the status and interests of one ethnic community
from another, leading to the hyperethnicization of political, cultural,
and social life. Within this paradigm, women’s common causes have
had a limited chance of being sustained. Furthermore, women articulate their needs and rights differently and sometimes in contradictory
ways.37 However, the pressure for women to converge over common
issues began to be felt as soon as the legitimacy of the “Malay dominant” state was subjected to a challenge. Although the Reformasi period
was akin to a phase in which there was a kind of “social unmooring”
from “stable and hierarchical communal structures,”38 it may take
some time before a reorganization of fixed identities and, ultimately,
the development of new forms of agency will be fully realized.
V. Conclusion: Continuing the Search for Human Rights
and a Multicultural Democracy
As Malaysia today struggles to cope with its brand of political and economic uncertainties, it will also have to deal with the new challenge of
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pluralism as expressed by the demands for a more Islamized political
community. The emergence of struggles to enlarge the jurisdiction of
Islamic laws as well as calls for the eventual creation of an Islamic state
are some of the newer issues that will plague the leadership of the
country. The early social contract worked out by elite representatives
of the various communities is being challenged on many fronts. The
non-Bumiputera population of the country would like to see the dismantling of racial preferential policies (entrenched in the Constitution)
that obstruct the recognition of citizenship rights as the foundational
basis for equality.
On the other end, Malays will continue to assert their claim to political dominance. It will not be focused so much on the notion of ethnic
supremacy (Ketuanan Melayu) as on their inalienable right to observe
their particularistic system of beliefs and faith, which is Islam. Islam
will be further waxed to become the unchallengeable demarcation for
difference and will be employed to legitimate the setting up of an alternative system of governance, either to coexist with existing secular
institutions or to displace the old system altogether. This is the basis of
the present contention in Malaysian politics. The debate about the suitability of an Islamic system imposed upon a plural society like
Malaysia will center around several issues, namely, the citizenship status of non-Muslims, the question of gender equality, and the right of
individuals to religious autonomy. Can tensions within diversity be
resolved by setting up parallel systems of governance, one set applicable for Muslims and the other for non-Muslims? If all cultures and religious traditions were to be accepted as having equal worth, then how
can all of these demands, many of which are of a conflicting nature, be
accommodated in multiethnic Malaysia? If gender equality is a principle that women (or at least a great many women) want to translate into
pragmatic policy, then how can this principle be allowed to be invalidated by a religious system that privileges a male-centric discourse
and outlook?
The intersection of gender, race, and religion in post-developmental
Malaysia has produced the above set of questions. Gender, race, and
religion have always constituted the multifaceted political and cultural
paradigm serving to energize the imaginations of expedient state players but also to enervate the strength of civil society, which is trying to
chart a straight path toward enlightened liberalism and a workable
multicultural democracy. From Malaysia’s phase of nationalist strivings until the current manifestation of post-developmentalism, the

98

Maznah Mohamad

intersection of gender, race, and religion has taken on many shifting
dimensions. It has become the mirror of a ceaseless experiment
mounted by the state and civil society to manage the pluralism in their
midst. 嘷
䢇
Notes
1. This latest census is reported in “Census Shows More Malays, Smaller Percentage of
Chinese, Indians,” www.malaysiakini.com (7 November 2001).
2. Pang 2001, pp. 582 – 583.
3. Ibid., p. 583.
4. This oversimplified collapsing of the three categories of race belies the diversity of the
multiethnic communities that actually existed in the country under colonialism.
Although the Malays and indigenous tribal communities were the earliest settlers of
Malaya (the name used to refer to the current peninsular West Malaysia), immigrants
who came to settle in the land came from various parts of the world. The early censuses
in Malaya were more cognizant of the numerous variety of ethnic categories then being
used. See Nagata, The Malaysian Mosaic (Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press, 1976).
5. Manderson 1980; Dancz 1987; Mohamad 2002.
6. Khoo 1994, pp. 1 – 2.
7. Ibid., p. 3.
8. This information was given by F.R. Bhupalan in 1995. My speculation is that the
Women Teacher’s Union must have been one of the earliest associations that had a multiracial women’s membership. To date, there is a dearth of study of this association.
9. Dancz 1987, pp. 139 – 141.
10. Ibid., p. 140.
11. Ramli 1998.
12. Ibrahim 1998.
13. Ramli 1998.
14. Lee and Clark 2000, p. 19.
15. In Malaysia, the identity of “race” is virtually predetermined. Being Malay also
means being Muslim, according to its constitution. Further, Malays and other indigenous communities are conferred the status of Bumiputeras, literally, “sons of the soil.”
Under the aegis of the NEP, which was promulgated in 1972, Bumiputeras are entitled to
special privileges or subsidies, ranging from places in higher education to preferential
credit access.
16. Kessler 1992, p. 139.
17. Jesudason 1996.
18. Munro-Kua 1996.
19. The concepts of pragmatic acquiescence and instrumental acceptance are borrowed from
Held 1997, p. 182.
20. Heng 1988; Tan 1992.
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21. It is sometimes jocularly said that “freedom” among non-Muslims is now reduced to
having the social and legal license to drink, eat pork, gamble, and dress as one pleases.
For example, one letter writer to the Internet newspaper Malaysiakini, dated January 17,
2001, had this to say: “Years away from its socialist origins, DAP is more immediately
concerned about such issues as the right to be agnostic, to gamble, and to drink liquor.
These were the nuts and bolts for playing racial politics, a ploy that has long been successful.” The freedom to openly and publicly practice religious and traditional rituals,
such as religious processions, is considered to be one of the highest tests of the state’s
ability to accommodate ethnic rights. The ruling National Front government uses these
indicators of “tolerance” in election campaigns to affirm its credentials as the only legitimate arbiter of inter-ethnic relations.
22. Von Vorys 1975, pp. 386 –387.
23. Tan 1999.
24. Lim 1978; Grossman 1979.
25. Ong 1987, p. 183.
26. Ibid., p. 185.
27. Shamsul 1986.
28. Hashim 1996.
29. Othman 1996.
30. For details, see Weiss 1999; Subramaniam 2001; and Mohamad 2001.
31. The Malaysian National Commission of Human Rights (Suhakam) conducted an
enquiry on allegations of police brutality against protestors at the Kesas Highway rally
in 2000. The report, which came out in 2001, indicated that the government had clearly
violated the rights of the peaceful protestors when police violence was used against
them. In April 2001, several leading figures of the opposition National Justice Party were
detained without trial under the Internal Security Act.
32. She later stood for the parliamentary seat previously occupied by Anwar and won it
with a convincing majority.
33. She did not win the seat but reduced the winning margin of the incumbent candidate
by a substantial number of votes.
34. Being Muslim, she was often cajoled during the campaign period to put on the veil
when she had to address a crowd together with male Islamic party speakers. She refused
but was not rebuked in any way, perhaps because the campaign period was too short
and critical to allow for any dissension to develop.
35. Jaquette 1991, p. 13.
36. Lister 1997, p. 80.
37. Although there have been attempts by Tan (1999) to show that an alliance among
many diverse Malaysian women’s groups was possible in the case of lobbying for the
country’s Domestic Violence Act, the mobilization of women in this case was still limited
to an exclusive segment of civil society, namely, middle-class feminist groups with the
backing of the country’s oldest, mainstream women’s organization.
38. Mann 1997, pp. 226 – 117.
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